Colombia’s long-running conflict has found a new recruiting ground, one that fits inside a child’s pocket.
Human Rights Watch has warned that illegal armed groups are increasingly using TikTok, Facebook and other social-media platforms to recruit children, combining propaganda, promises of money and status, coded language and carefully chosen emojis to draw minors toward illegal armed organizations.
The warning comes as Colombia confronts a growing child-recruitment crisis and a grim parallel reality: children forced into armed groups are increasingly among those killed in military operations against them.
Human Rights Watch estimates that more than 1,500 children have been recruited by criminal organizations since 2021, based on data from the Ombudsperson’s Office. The organization says the real number is likely considerably higher because families often fear reprisals, distrust authorities or do not know how to report cases.
The Defensoría del Pueblo recorded 1,173 cases of children and adolescents being illegally recruited between 2024 and July 31, 2026. Ombudsperson Iris Marín has warned that a decline in reported cases should not be interpreted as evidence that recruitment is stalling.“A reduction in reported cases does not imply a decrease in recruitment, but rather an increase in underreporting,” Marín said.
The phenomenon is concentrated in some of Colombia’s most violent regions, where the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and other FARC dissident factions, the ELN and the Clan del Golfo compete for territory and control of illicit economies.
But the battlefield is no longer confined to rural Colombia.
According to Human Rights Watch, armed groups have learned to use the language and culture of social media to make recruitment appear less threatening. Posts can feature motorcycles, weapons, cash, military-style clothing and images designed to glamorize life inside an armed organization.
In some cases, even an emoji can be part of the message.
Human Rights Watch documented the use of symbols including ninjas, clovers and bundles of cash, as well as altered spellings and coded references to armed groups, apparently designed to evade platform moderation while reaching younger audiences.
The organization reviewed dozens of TikTok and Facebook accounts and posts that promoted armed groups or encouraged children to join them. Some attracted thousands of followers and generated significant levels of engagement.
The recruitment can begin with what appears to be an ordinary conversation.
Children may be offered money, transportation, employment or the prospect of a more glamorous life. Once contact has been established, recruiters can move the conversation away from public platforms and into private messaging.
Human Rights Watch found that social media played a significant role in recruitment, with the Special Jurisdiction for Peace reporting that 44% of children recruited in 2025 were recruited through social networks.
The use of social media presents Colombian authorities with a new challenge: the traditional warning signs of recruitment can be invisible until a child has already been drawn into an armed structure.
The Defensoría says there are also numerous minors believed to be present in the ranks of the dissident factions led by Iván Mordisco and Calarcá whose cases have never entered official statistics. Marín has also pointed to growing recruitment in Catatumbo, where the ELN and the dissident Frente 33 remain active.
Guaviare has become one of the clearest examples of the danger.
On Aug. 27, Colombian forces carried out Operation Amón against a FARC dissident camp in rural El Retorno. Three minors, aged 15 and 16, were among those killed, according to Medicina Legal. The operation was followed by renewed scrutiny of the government’s decision to use aerial force against armed groups that may contain recruited children.
The deaths brought the number of minors killed in military operations under Colombia’s last three presidents to 107, according to figures from Medicina Legal: 42 during Iván Duque’s government, 62 during Gustavo Petro’s and three during the first weeks of President Abelardo de la Espriella’s administration.
The numbers underline a painful contradiction.
Children who have been forcibly recruited are victims of armed groups, yet once inside their camps they can become casualties of the state’s campaign against those same organizations.
That dilemma is becoming particularly acute under De la Espriella’s new government as he moves rapidly to revive offensive military operations. His hardline security policy aims to dismantle Petro’s capitulation to illegal armed groups and pursuit of amnesty agreements under a failed “total peace” policy.
The new government has defended the Guaviare operation, saying military forces complied with the legal requirements governing aerial attacks. Defense officials have argued that minors participating in hostilities can constitute legitimate military targets under international humanitarian law, while human-rights organizations have insisted that the presence of recruited children requires heightened precautions and careful assessment before an attack.
The debate is not new.
During Petro’s leftist administration, 62 minors were killed in military operations, according to Medicina Legal. The figure became particularly controversial in late 2025, when several children recruited by FARC dissidents were killed during military bombings. The City Paper previously reported on the deaths of 15 minors in four military operations that year.
What has changed, over this decade, is the speed with which recruitment is taking place online.
For Colombia, preventing the next child from entering an armed camp may therefore require more than military intelligence or patrols in remote territories. It may require understanding what happens on a teenager’s phone long before a soldier encounters that youngster in the jungle.
And by the time Colombia discovers that another child has gone missing, it may already be too late.
