Colombia has long been the capstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. But under the presidency of Gustavo Petro, the two countries are increasingly finding themselves on opposite sides of a widening diplomatic divide. On July 3, relations took a dramatic turn when the U.S. State Department announced the recall of its top diplomat in Bogotá, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim John McNamara, for “urgent consultations” over what it called “baseless and reprehensible” comments made by high-ranking Colombian officials. Within hours, President Petro fired back by recalling Colombia’s ambassador in Washington, Daniel García-Peña, for discussions on the state of the bilateral agenda.
Though the State Department offered few details, the recall is widely seen as a response to Petro’s repeated claims that the United States is plotting to topple his government. In several speeches this year, Petro pressed the notion of a “coup” warning of “international conspiracies” led by foreign powers and internal oligarchs, including his first Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán. At a recent rally in Cali, Petro explicitly named Secretary of State Marco Rubio, accusing him of being part of an extreme right-wing alliance to destabilize his leftist government. U.S. officials dismissed the allegations as “delusional,” but the very public remarks appear to have pushed the relationship to a breaking point.
Republican Congressman Carlos Gimenez issued a stern warning on social media, stating: “All this is a media circus by Gustavo Petro and his cronies to distract the Colombian people from his terrible management, corruption, and mishandling of public funds. Let these complicit puppets not complain later when they and their families are denied visas to enter the United States. Let them go visit the communist dictatorships of Cuba and Venezuela that they so fiercely defend.”
Columnist Enrique Santos Calderón has compared the moment to the 1990s visa scandal that engulfed then-President Ernesto Samper, whose ties to narco-financing led the Clinton administration to revoke his entry privileges. “It is not out of the question that Petro could end up without a visa as well,” Santos wrote. “For very different reasons, certainly, but the desolating fact is that we’ve returned to a similar situation.”
While Petro insists that his government seeks constructive relations with the United States—highlighting cooperation on clean energy, migration, and drug policy—the diplomatic chill tells another story. Behind the rhetoric lies a deeper ideological divide. Petro’s foreign policy seeks to reposition Colombia as a leader of the Global South, no longer beholden to U.S. strategic interests. Yet such aspirations collide with realities. Colombia remains heavily reliant on American intelligence sharing, military aid, and preferential trade arrangements.
The deterioration of ties has been building for months. In January, Petro’s government refused to admit two U.S. planes carrying deported Colombian nationals, triggering a 12-hour suspension of consular services. The issue was resolved only after Bogotá agreed to cover repatriation costs, reportedly under threat of tariffs on Colombian exports and a freeze on visa services. The incident foreshadowed the current impasse, revealing both the fragility of the relationship and Washington’s willingness to use pressure tactics.
The larger concern for U.S. officials is what they see as Petro’s undermining of Colombia’s counter-narcotics framework. His “Total Peace” initiative, which prioritizes negotiations with armed groups over enforcement, has infuriated U.S. lawmakers – particularly as coca cultivation has surged to historic highs. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime recorded 253,000 hectares of coca in Colombia in 2023, the highest ever. Petro’s refusal to extradite two FARC dissident commanders wanted in the United States for drug trafficking has further exacerbated tensions.
The diplomatic row anticipated the abrupt resignation of Foreign Minister Laura Sarabia, a key Petro ally and former chief of staff, who cited disagreements she could “no longer support out of personal integrity and institutional respect.” Political insiders now speculate that Sarabia may have foreseen fallout from Washington, including potential visa sanctions, and opted for a strategic departure. Her resignation leaves Colombia’s foreign ministry rudderless at a particularly sensitive time. “The foreign policy of this government has been plagued by blunders,” noted Santos Calderón. “Fighting battles you can’t win is costly, and Petro doesn’t seem to realize how high the stakes are.”
The stakes are indeed growing. Just days before the diplomatic tit-for-tat, Colombian police arrested Elder José Arteaga Hernández, alias “El Costeño,” one of the alleged masterminds behind the daylight assassination attempt against conservative senator and presidential hopeful Miguel Uribe Turbay. Authorities believe Arteaga contracted the teenage hitman through an elaborate criminal network that included other recruits, such as getaway drivers and a 19-year-old woman arrested in the southeastern department of Caquetá. Though the attempted assassination remains unrelated to the U.S. diplomatic conflict, the attack against the 39-year-old senator underscores the mounting internal pressures Petro is facing.
Back in Washington, Senator Rubio and others are demanding visa cancellations for Colombian officials accused of sympathizing with or protecting criminal groups. Rubio has accused Petro of “turning Colombia into another Venezuela.” Though the White House has not acted on those calls, there is growing consensus in Washington that Petro’s administration has become an unreliable partner.
Florida Congresswoman María Elvira Salazar also made her position clear on X, noting: “As a representative of thousands of Colombian-Americans, I will not remain silent in the face of a government that destroys the economy, fuels political violence, and allows drug trafficking to skyrocket. Interference? No. Interference is turning Colombia into another Venezuela.”
At a recent international forum in Seville, Petro’s informal appearance in a sweat-stained guayabera shirt – surrounded by suited world leaders – prompted Santos Calderón to remark dryly: “President Macron gave our president a subtle lesson in the inelegance of showing up feeling too self-important.” He added, “Another wouldn’t hurt – on attire and protocol.”
For Petro, these confrontations serve to reinforce his image as a Latin American caudillo testing the limits of U.S. policy in the region. But for Colombia, the consequences could be severe. If the U.S. moves toward decertification – formally declaring that Colombia is not meeting its counter-narcotics obligations – the result would be a loss of trade privileges, aid, and financial credibility.
As Colombia and the United States mark 203 years of diplomatic relations, few in the political center and right are celebrating. “We don’t know how this crisis will end,” concluded Santos Calderón. “But soon, we will find out just how far the cup has overflowed.”
