Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro is preparing for a high-profile visit to Beijing this May, where he is expected to sign a letter of intent to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – a global infrastructure and investment scheme that critics say expands Beijing’s influence at the expense of Western allies. For Petro, the visit represents a dramatic geopolitical pivot—one that could reshape Colombia’s foreign relations for years to come, but also raise serious concerns about national interests being subsumed by ideological ambition.
The Belt and Road Initiative, first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, has become the centerpiece of China’s global strategy, investing billions of dollars in roads, ports, railways, and digital networks in over 150 countries. Supporters argue that it brings much-needed infrastructure to developing nations. Skeptics view it as a thinly veiled mechanism for exporting Chinese authoritarian influence and indebting poorer nations in exchange for political allegiance.
Until now, Colombia had resisted China’s overtures. For decades, it remained one of the United States’ most steadfast partners in the region, tightly bound by trade agreements, military cooperation, and anti-narcotics strategies. But under Petro, the first left-wing president in the country’s history, the winds have shifted.
Petro has repeatedly expressed frustration with what he sees as U.S. indifference toward Colombia’s development needs and its enduring conflicts. His foreign policy has veered toward what some call “non-alignment,” and others view as a rejection of the liberal democratic consensus. “Future governments will decide if this intention becomes a reality,” Petro said of the BRI agreement, attempting to downplay the move as non-binding. But few doubt the symbolism of this decision. In the escalating great-power rivalry between the United States and China, no act is neutral.
Colombia’s relations with Washington have grown increasingly tense. Petro’s administration has clashed with U.S. officials over coca eradication, human rights, and migration enforcement. In January, he denied entry to two U.S. military planes carrying deported Colombians. A furious response from former President Donald Trump, who remains a dominant figure in Republican foreign policy circles, followed: a 25% tariff on Colombian imports. Bogotá attempted to retaliate but quickly backed down, sending its own planes to collect the migrants. It was a diplomatic debacle that underscored just how frayed ties had become.
Most recently, Petro suggested that the “extreme right” in the U.S. – “the same that killed JFK” – was plotting to unseat him. Republican Congressman Mario Díaz-Balart fired back, implying that Petro was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The episode would have been unthinkable a decade ago, but it has become emblematic of Petro’s confrontational and improvisational diplomatic style.
Behind the outbursts on social media, the shift toward China appears to be deliberate. In recent months, Chinese officials in Bogotá have ramped up their lobbying efforts, encouraging Colombia to join the BRI before Petro’s term ends next year. The Chinese ambassador to Colombia, Zhu Jingyang, told El Tiempo that the bilateral relationship was “at its best moment” in 45 years.
Colombian Foreign Minister, Laura Sarabia, insists the move should not be seen as a provocation to Washington. “We continue to maintain relations with the United States and a constant dialogue,” she said, citing regional development goals and the need for international cooperation in areas like drug policy and infrastructure investment.
But the optics are hard to ignore. Petro’s trip comes just months after Panama, under U.S. pressure, withdrew from the BRI. In contrast, Colombia’s move will be read in Beijing as a diplomatic win – another Latin American country stepping into China’s growing sphere of influence.
Colombian business leaders have expressed concern over Petro’s Beijing gamble. The country’s economic future remains deeply tied to the U.S., which accounts for over 30% of its exports. Colombia also benefits from preferential trade terms under agreements championed by Washington – terms that could be threatened if relations continue to sour.
U.S. officials are increasingly skeptical of Colombia’s trajectory – and with ongoing concerns about the country’s surging coca production, now estimated at over 300,000 hectares – Colombia risks losing its certification status with the U.S. This could jeopardize security funding and key trade benefits that have long underpinned the bilateral relationship.
Even Petro’s musings about his own visa status in the United States have fueled perceptions of instability. No formal action has been taken by the Department of State, but the mere suggestion underscores how much trust has eroded.
Petro’s tilt toward Beijing may yield investment. China has the capital and ambition to build the highways and digital networks that Colombia desperately needs. But at what cost? The BRI has left many countries saddled with debt and beholden to opaque contracts, with limited oversight or local benefit.
President Xi will preside over the upcoming 4th Ministerial Meeting of the China–CELAC Forum (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) in Beijing later this month against the backdrop of tense trade deals between the U.S.
Petro’s supporters may frame his visit to China as a bold step toward a multipolar world. But to opposition leaders, including former President Iván Duque, it is yet another chapter in a presidency marked by unpredictability, spectacle, and ideological fervor. “I have expressed that my government was never in favor of Colombia joining the BRI, so our country would not end up subject to China’s strategic interests and could maintain its independence in conducting our international relations,” stated the conservative leader on social media.
“Petro is determined to bankrupt the country,” remarked right-wing Senator and 2026 presidential hopeful María Fernanda Cabal in response to a statement from Mauricio Claver-Carone, the U.S. State Department’s special envoy for Latin America, in which he warns Petro that any trip to China is an “opportunity for Ecuadorian roses and Central American coffee.”
